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A number of European countries have devolved health care services to subnational 
units. This is especially the case in unitary states that are organised as a national 
health services (NHS), where choice is not ‘build in’ the health system and funding is 
based on general taxation. This policy review paper argues that, in such settings, 
there are two distinct models of devolving authority to subnational jurisdictions: a 
‘federacy model’ where only a few territories obtain health care responsibilities (such 
as in the United Kingdom), and a ‘systems model’ where the whole health system is 
devolved to a full set of subnational units, (such as in Spain). The choice of one or the 
other influences the spatial diversity of health care activity  and the extent  of policy 
interdependence across regions. We discuss evidence from the UK and Spain  to 
shed some light on the likely effect of each model of devolution. Our results indicate 
that a ‘system model’ gives rise to significant policy interdependence and lower 
regional than a ‘federacy model’. 
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The devolution of public service responsibility in unitary states is a common 
trend throughout European countries.  The OECD (2016) reports that lmost 35% of 
public money is spent at the sub-national government level1, and it mainly is 
allocated to fund education, healthcare as well as other key policy areas. Consistntly, 
a number of European countries have devolved health care services to subnational 
units (Costa-Font and Greer, 2013). This is a response to a number of different 
pressures including demands for the expansion of government responsiveness and 
accountability, efficiency and competition and the enhancement of policy 
innovation. Such differences give rise to an heterogeneous distribution of authority 
across the territory. This policy paper examines such heterogeneity in the 
distribution of health care authority, and how it impacts in some autcomes. More 
specifically, it will attempt to distinguish between different ‘models’ of devolution, 
namely a ‘federacy model’ and a ‘system model’. 
We identify a first model of devolution as a  ‘federacy model’, namely one based on 
the transfer of government responsibilities only to certain specific territories whilst 
the bulk of the country remain centrally managed. Typically, territories that qualify 
as ‘federacies’ can be identified by some distinctive characteristics such as historical 
rights (e.g., Scotland in the UK or the Basque Country and Catalonia in Spain) or, an 
implicit demand by the citizenry2 among other. However, for the sake of this study it 
is not important what determined the setup of a federacy, but the effects of adopting 
a federacy model rather than an alternative one.  The alternative model one can 
devise sits at the other end of the institutional spectrum, and consists in a model 
	
1 Although only 15% of fiscal revenues tend to be descentralised 
2 This article does not purposefully focus on identifying such historical or distinctive features, but on 
examining the effects on two relevant policy outcome bearing in mind that both countries examined 
could have adopted either model of devolution.  
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where all territorial units are held responsible for a specific policy domain. The latter 
is irrespectively of the existence of a pre-existing demand for self-governance or 
historical rights.  We define such a model as a ‘system of regional governments’, or 
simply, a ‘systems model’. In both models health care is publicly funded, and funds 
allocated to region states in diverse ways. However, most countries employ 
capitated block grants (e.g., such as the Barnett formula in the UK or an equivalent 
transfer mechanism in Spain).  Similarly, government activity is limited by 
framework legislation set out at the time of the transfer of government 
responsibilities. Both models are mutually exclusive, hence, countries that have 
implemented one model of federalism could well have set up an alternative one. 
However, whether one model of the other performs better is not trivial, and the 
purpose of this paper is to contribute to this debate.  
Among the main reasons for advocating one model of governance over another, it is 
claimed, is that of regional ‘equality’ in the provision of health care. Indeed, in 
unitary states political pressures tend to develop demands for service uniformity on 
the grounds of equity. Medical trade unions in the UK have called at times for the 
centralisation of the working conditions of professionals working for the NHS on the 
grounds of a hypothetical fragmentation of the NHS, and the need to strengthen the 
stewardship of the ministry of health. However, the spread of devolution in Spain 
shows that devolution instead opens up a game of ‘follow-the-leader’ where regions 
implementing new reforms (e.g., the Basque Country, Navarra and Catalonia) show 
the way; the others demand equal treatment, and reforms become widespread in the 
territory3.  Hence, it is an empirical question whether keeping health services 
centralised does indeed manage to reduce the diversity of the health system. This is 
	
3 Other regions such as regional of Madrid only got health care responsibilities in 2002 so could not be 
a regional leader in the period analyzed. Other regions such as Galicia and Valencia were not 
pioneers. However, over time, almost every regional did put forward some regional specific, and 
often-innovative health programs.  
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especially the case when health care activity and, more generally, the demand for 
public services is often beyond government control; such as the health care 
preferences of patients and doctors with regarded to what they value the most form 
health system benefits. These are at least partly driven by differences and needs (e.g., 
higher concentration of elderly people might lead to a demand of rehabilitation etc.).  
A ‘systems model’ such as the one we observe in Spain, can give rise to some 
significant policy interdependence where a number of regions adopt policies that 
have been already implemented in other regions, and have shown evidence of 
success. However, in the absence of such policy interdependence one would expect 
to see diversity in the system. In contrast, ‘federacies’ are designed to develop 
‘distinct’ health services and hence policy interdependence is not what it seeks to 
promote, and rarely leads to policy transfer. However, given that a number of 
regions remain centrally run (e.g. the NHS in England), one would expect to find 
that uniform policies and regulation would limit diversity, even though that does 
not necessarily imply outcome uniformity. Whether the dynamics of 
interdependence are different across governance models, and more specifically, 
whether they impact in terms of outcome diversity in a different way is a question 
on which we can garner some evidence.  
The UK stands out as a typical example of a ‘federacy model’ where English regions 
remain governed by Whitehall, but the three other countries of the UK – Wales, 
Scotland and N. Ireland – after 2001 were governed from their own territories.  In 
contrast, but at the same time, Spain transferred health care responsibilities to all the 
Spanish regions or Autonomous Communities (ACs). Originally, health care 
decentralisation was asymmetric but after 2001 such a more symmetrical system was 
achieved. Hence, Spain qualifies as a ‘systems model’. 
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Note that our model distinction is different from the traditional symmetric and 
asymmetric federalism, as a system model can be asymmetric in its funding (e.g., 
Basque Country or Navarra in Spain), and a ‘federacy model’ can be symmetric in its 
funding (e.g., Barnett’s formula in the UK). The difference between the suggested 
models lies in two different strategies of devolution, one based on dividing the entire 
territory in governance units (systems model) and the other, in keeping most of the 
country centralised and only devolving health care to some countries within the UK 
(federacy model). 
This  policy note sets out to contribute to the questions of ‘what impact does 
devolution (understood as the regional descentralisation of government activity) 
have on regional inequality in government activity, and the extent to which the 
model of devolution makes a difference to this relationship. Specifically, given that 
both Spain and the UK could have adopted either respective model, we examine 
whether there are significant differences in terms of regional disparities. To do so, 
we draw on evidence from the United Kingdom (UK) and Spanish health care 
devolution. We distinguish the period before and after the onset of the financial 
crises to examine the potential effect of heterogeneity resulting from spending cuts 
across the territory. Given that Spain and the UK have a similar health care financing 
(tax) system, they are reasonably comparable on other grounds. Adding more 
countries to the analysis would increase the variation on those other features. 
 Health funding in both the UK and Spain is comparable in that both are tax funded 
and have expended the same proportion of their GDP to health care (see Figure 1). 
Finally, both are unitary states subject to comparable contexts.   
This paper puts forward the claim that there are different models of devolving 
authority to subnational jurisdictions, and these are consequential. We examine the 
extent of the impact of the ‘devolution model’ on two health system outcomes, 
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specifically regional disparities and the extent of policy interdependence.  Our 
findings suggest that evidence of the ‘system model’ of health care devolution 
examined (Spain) promotes ‘homogeneity’ and policy explicit interdependence in 
contract in the UK, even when emulation might take place there is no cognition of 
the process for political reasons, and diversity is marinating by setting different, and 
often, non comparable policy goals.  We find that regional inequalities exhibit a 
declining pattern in both Spain and, and the UK. However, the trends in the latter 
are much weaker.  
The remaining of paper is organised as follows. Section two sets out the theoretical 
background employed in this paper. Section three provides a literature review in 
context of ‘varieties of devolution’ and the relationship between devolution and 
regional inequality. Sections four and five will present this paper’s results and 
discussion.  
2.  Background  
2.1 The Devolution Puzzle 
 The process of devolution and its impact upon regional inequality has gained 
credence within the literature. Some theory suggests that devolution may in fact 
increase regional inequality because as resources are passed to sub central 
governments or regions, it consequently weakens inter-regional distribution 
intended for regional convergence (Prud’homme, 1995). In contrast, some work 
argues that devolution helps to reduce regional inequality (Oates, 1972; 1993). 
However, this literature does not distinguish between different models of 
devolution, and does not specifically examine a homogenous sector of policy 
activity. Indeed, some public services are more likely to be devolved to sub central 
governments across countries than others. Health care is the most common public 
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service responsibility that has been devolved among European Union member 
states, and hence it has been compared across countries.  The focus on one public 
service (health care) is important as health care is comparable across the two 
countries under examination in both how it is funded and the principles it is 
grounded. However, in what  follow we not attempt to describe the institutional 
differences and historical legacies between Spain and the UK, but the observed 
regularities in policy outcomes after devolution was implemented bearing in mind 
that health care was centrally managed before devolution was implemented, and 
that both countries could have adopted either model of devolution described (e.g., 
Spain could have devolved health care only to Catalonia, Basque Country and 
Galicia, or the UK could have devolved health care to all English regions too). 
 Whilst the devolution process in the UK was indeed accelerated under the ‘New’ 
Labour government, a centre-left party, of 1997-2010, the current Conservative 
government of 2015, has also taken a ‘pro-devolution’ stance and it too has begun to 
speed up the process4 . The second caveat proffered by Costa-Font (2010 a, b) 
concerns innovation in welfare systems. He argues that experimentation can lead to 
enhancements in welfare at the regional levels and support of this, Costa-Font and 
Rico (2006a) found that, more prominently, innovation in one region can spread to 
others and thus create a ‘race to the top’ as opposed to the argument of a ‘race to the 
bottom’. Moreover, in a further study Costa-Font and Rico (2006b) argue that if 
successful policies are copied by neighbouring and other regions i.e. via lesson 
drawings, regional inequality would decrease and not increase. They conclude that 
devolution actually decreases regional inequality (see also McEwen, 2005; Shaw et al. 
2009).  
	
4 As can be seen in the example of the devolution of healthcare spending to Manchester. Moreover, in 
the Chancellor George Osbourne’s budget in July 2015, he also put forward the devolution of 
expenditure to Cornwall and set out on a so called ‘devolution revolution’.  
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 The explanation of policy diffusion and divergence for the reduction in inequalities 
and the reasons behind different politico-economic systems has been put forward by 
various scholars. MacKinnon (2015) who argues that devolution has had a significant 
impact upon public policy both in Wales and Scotland. Another long term impact 
put forward in the literature is the political influence upon policy which has 
produced divergence for example in Wales and Scotland, less market-orientated 
reforms, with more social democratic approaches to policy (Mackinnon, 2015; Greer 
2003; Birrell, 2010). Indeed, given that latter governance models (localism and public 
health in Wales vs. professionalism and cooperation in Scotland) are chosen policy 
options, they were intended models of governance which could have been adopted 
by other countries in the UK.   
The models of governance within the UK are not absent of comparison, emulation or 
policy learning, although the strategy was instead not to acknowledge comparative 
improvements in other countries and set diverging policy goals instead.  For 
example, there is little doubt that longer waiting times in Wales compared with 
England spurred the Welsh Assembly government to give waiting time reduction 
greater priority.  Scotland similarly took waiting times more seriously when its 
government saw performance in England.  However, there was no explicit 
recognition of the process for obvious political reasons, and instead they focusing 
diverging policy goals to avoind being compared.  
Undoubtedly, it is these political games per se that have a bearing upon policy and 
thus, make up the types of devolution seen in Spain and the UK. Therefore, within a 
federacy the politics of difference is a central characteristic. 
3. Models of Devolution: The UK and Spain 
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 Both the UK and Spain embarked on their process of devolution for similar reasons, 
and can be defined as unitary states that share some aspects of federal states (‘quasi-
federal states’). Both the UK and Spain differ significantly in terms of the transfer of 
powers to their regional governments. Therefore, we can argue that both the UK and 
Spain exhibit different ‘varieties of devolution’ and that devolution is indeed highly 
variegated in these two examples (Peck and Theodore, 2007). Devolution in the UK 
is based upon the separation of political and fiscal powers between the devolved 
parliaments of Scotland, Wales and N. Ireland, and the UK parliament (Keating, 
2002; Mackinnon, 2015). Therefore, some leeway is given to these devolved 
governments in the development of their own particular policies. Nevertheless, the 
UK Parliament, can still legislate under law, in theory and in practice, for Scotland, 
Wales and N. Ireland.  
In the UK, the three devolved administrations receive a block allocation from the UK 
Parliament in Westminster out of which they have to decide what proportion should 
be allocated to the NHS, social care, education and so on.  This compared t the 
Spanish case where block grants are received form the Spanish government except 
for the Basque Countty and Navarra who are fully fiscally accountable. However, it 
is important to point out that the Barnett formula that determines these block 
allocations predates political devolution.   
An important difference between the UK and Spain lies in that post-devolution UK 
lacks any UK-wide, federal governance institutions.  For example, there is no federal 
ministry of health.  However, this is not the case in Spain where the Minisitry of 
Health does exist and exerts some important coordinantion roles alongside the 
provision of information. The only exception where the UK and Spain compared is 
the fact that the English Department of Health undertakes some UK-wide roles on 
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behalf of the other three devolved administrations in relation to international 
relations affecting the NHS.   
The Government of Wales Act 1998 was the impetus for devolution in Wales, 
creating the Welsh Assembly and devolving powers in areas such as healthcare 
provision. The Scotland Act 1998 in contrast, granted powers to the Scottish 
Parliament on a reserved basis whilst in Northern Ireland, the Good Friday 
Agreement 1998 paved the way for the devolution of powers under the Northern 
Ireland Act 1998. It is also important to note that the devolved parliaments have 
narrow revenue-raising powers (MacKinnon, 2015). Importantly, and similalrly to 
the Spanish case, the devolved assemblies and Scottish Parliament in the UK are 
elected on a quite different basis from the Westminster Parliament, using variant 
forms of proportional representation and that this may well affect the nature of the 
policies adopted in the devolved administrations.  Hence, the political majorities in 
the develoved assemblies do not necessarily reproduce the elelctoral results of 
nation-wide elelctions.  
As of 2014, Wales has received some limited tax raising powers in the form of stamp 
duty and landfill tax. Absent from devolution is England, which has one 
government and legislature, namely the UK Government and UK parliament 
respectively, compared to two each for Scotland, Wales and N. Ireland. The UK, 
therefore, can be best described as a state categorised by the ‘federacy model’ (Rokan 
and Unwin, 1983; Rhodes, 1997; Keating, 1998; Cooke and Clifton, 2005). In contrast 
to the UK, Spain has a different devolutionary arrangement. Paradoxically, Spain 
began as a highly centralised, unitary state which has undertaken asymmetric 
devolution, passing power to the 17 ‘autonomous communities’, (Carbonell and 
Alcalde, 2008; Maiz et al. 2008). However, Spanish devolution has evolved a 
‘systems model’, especially in the area of health care. Since 2002, all ACs have had 
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the same responsibilities except for two; the Basque Country and Navarra, which 
collect their own taxes and are thus, fiscally independent and politically accountable 
for running healthcare provision (Prieto and Lago-Penas, 2012).  
 The concept of ‘varieties of devolution’ is directly applicable to healthcare because 
unlike the UK where healthcare is devolved to Scotland, Wales and N. Ireland, 
although not yet to England and its regions (apart from Manchester as of 2015), 
Spanish healthcare management is devolved to its 17 ACs.  
 
The size of the devolved administration are consistent with the federacy in the UK v 
system model of devolution in Spain. Although the total population of the UK is 
larger  overall than Spain, the UK model has kept until 2014 an English NHS that 
provides care to 53 million individuals centralised, whilst the population of the 
devolved adminsitartions amount only to one fith of of such figure ( Scotland 5.2 
million, 3 million and Notern Ireland 1.8 million). In contrast in Spain, the 47 million 
inhabitants receive descentralised health care and regional populationsize ranges 
from 8 million in Andalucia, 7.5 million in Catalonia to 0.3 million in La Rioja. 
 
Finally, it has been argued that the UK is characterised by four healthcare models. 
Wales adopted a system based on localism, a bottom up approach to healthcare. In 
comparison, Scotland exhibits a model of medical professionalism, Northern Ireland a 
model of permissive managerialism; whilst the English model, unsurprisingly, is 
focused on a market and performance management approach (Greer, 2004). The notion 
of the ‘politics of difference’ is a central characteristic in the type of devolution 
associated with the UK, and is directly reflected in the approach to healthcare. This 
approach can be attributed to the permissive nature of the type of devolution, which 
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facilitates policy divergence (Mackinnon, 2015; Greer, 2007, Jeffery, 2007). Spain, in 
contrast with its devolved healthcare systems and independent fiscal regions, is 
more akin to the ‘systems’ model of devolution.  
4. Regional Diversity 
To examine the effects of devolution on convergence, a simple and commonly 
accepted strategy is to identify a measure of health care output (unadjusted health 
expenditure per capita) and examine an inequality index. Consistently with previous 
studies we employ the coefficient of variation as its simple to interpret and its 
comparable  as in a number of previous studies (Costa-Font, 2010a, Costa-Gont and 
Turati, 2017).  Figure 2, provides the evidence of the trends in unadjusted per capita 
health expenditure in Spain, England and the UK as a whole.  Measure of coefficient 
of variation are based at the regional level, in the UK it follows the estimates of the 
Office of National Statistics which defined the 9 regional in England. Hence, overall 
the coefficients of variations are comparable for Spain and the UK. However, we 
limit the analysis between 2000-2009 to avoid the results being confounded with the 
effect of the economic downturn. Figure 1, suggests a reduction in the coefficient of 
variation of unadjusted public expenditure per capitals over the period 2000-2009, 
highlighting a downward trend in terms of regional disparities. For example, 
decreasing from 0.006 to 0.004 in the same period. In contrast, there is more of a 
discrepancy when analysing the UK as a whole, which has seen a more turbulent 
movement in the level of regional disparities, which is significantly larger when we 
examine England than the UK as a whole.  As such, in the short term, it can be 
argued that in the cases of both Spain and the UK, both show a decrease in regional 
inequality which happens to be speeder in the Spanish ‘system model’. Similar 
results are found when Italy is included in the analyssys as suggested by Costa-Font 
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and Turati (2017).  This results is consistent wuth our argument as Italy qualifies as a 
system model along the lines of  Spain.  
5. Policy discussion  
This policy note has discussed the effect of the  Spanish and British model of 
federalism on regional diversity and policy interdependence.  Overall, we find that 
that devolution has not increase regional inequalities, but in a systems model and in 
Spain we find a stark reduction of regional diversity and larger policy 
interdependence which is not observed in the Bristish model of devolution. This also 
consistent with Costa-Font (2010) who finds a reduction in regional inequalities in 
welfare activity in Spain, with devolution playing a significant role. Consistently 
with Pollock (1999) and Morgan (2002), we find that devolution has helped to 
address regional preferences in healthcare. Devolution has allow the NHS in Wales, 
Scotland and Northern  Ireland to be tailored to its preferences (e.g., elimination of 
prescription charges, free long term care in Scotland) overcoming the potential veto 
in a centralized UK-wide health system.  
Although we find that diversity in health care activity is higher in the UK than in 
Spain, this could be be explained by different political legacies and dynamics in 
additionl to the model of devolution However, these have not been radically 
modified over the period observed, and hence they are unlikely to explain the 
changing patterns of regional health inequality. Instead, explanations for the 
reduction of regional health care idiversity in Spain can be explained by the 
existence of policy interdpedencence, where  regions learned for each other and 
expand services that show successful results.  For example, there has been significant 
diffusion in health and ageing services in Catalonia, the right of a second media 
opinion in the Cananry Islands and the expansion of dental health care converage 
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for children in the Basque Country (Costa-Font and Rico, 2006). In contrast, the UK 
devolution was tailored to expand diversity. As Andrews and Martin (2010, p.929) 
note ‘the creation of new devolved political institutions in 1999 placed the pursuit of 
distinctive policy agendas on a far firmer constitutional footing… unleashing much 
more forceful and explicit expressions of the ideological and cultural differences 
between different parts of Britain’. The pursuit of policy divergence therefore plays a 
key role in debates such as the relationship between regional inequality in healthcare 
provision and devolution. However, the UK could lean towards a sustem model if 
further devolution was to take place in Engalnd. Should health policy be devolved to 
England as a whole -and that level of government made distinct from the UK level, a 
centre region dynamic might emerge.  Needless to say, one needs to acknowledge 
some level of policy comparison over health policy does exist in the UK, for example 
as between Wales and England does exist when it comes to the adoption of some 
policies like ambulance time target in England (Bevan, 2014). However, so far it has 
not produce major policy changes in the policy priorities of each countries. Finally,  
it is worth acknowledging that both models of devolution show no expansion of 
regional inequalities after devolution, and therefore the myth surrounding classical 
arguments against devolution on the basis of increased inequality should be 
dispelled.   
6. Conclusions 
This policy review paper compared two models of devolution implemented in Spain 
and the UK on policy diversity and interdependence. As expected our evidence 
suggests different trends on inequality in healthcare expenditure per capita and 
policy interdependencein Spain and the UK after devoliution. In the Spanish NHS 
we find large policy interdependence and stark reduction of regional inequalities, 
whilst in the UK we find an expansion of policy divergence, and hardly no change in 
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regional inequality patterns. Hence, these results shed light on a central feature of 
the devolution debate, namely that reducing central level government role in health 
policy making does not encompass the expansion of of regional inequalities, and can 
leads to spontaneous policy interdependence.  However, for obvious reasons the 
results do not establish a causal association. They are consistent with similar studies 
comparing devolution in Italy and Spain, which suggest that in both countries 
devolution did not increase regional inequalities (Costa-Font and Turati, 2017). 
However, it is important to bear in mind that these predictions do not automatically 
hold  on in other health systems where health care is not publicly funded.  
 
 This policy paper makes a contribution to the policy debate surrounding the 
potential impact of devolution on regional inequalities. As of February 2015, the UK 
government devolved control of National Health Service (NHS) spending to the 
Greater Manchester region. Budget responsibility will be devolved to a partnership 
of councils and local NHS commissioning groups and providers. Our results would 
suggest if devolution is extended to other English regions it has the potential to 
reduce regional inequality in healthcare. A policy that has hitherto not been adopted 
so far. Hence, there is a chance that existing regional diversity in the Bristish NHS 
could be corrected by further devolution of health care repsonsabilities ot regional 
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Figure 1. Relative Expenditure (%GDP) 
 















Source: MT Treasury and Spanish Ministry of Health, 20012. Note: Inequalities are 
measures as the coefficient of variation of the unadjusted per capita health care 
spending in each of the units examined. The coefficient of variation is defined as the 
ration between the standard deviation and the mean of the variable. 
 
